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Abstract 
Contract farming may be defined as agricultural production carried out according to a prior agreement in which 
the farmer commits to producing a given product in a given manner and the buyer commits to purchasing it. 
Proponents of contract farming argue that it links small-scale farmers to lucrative markets and solves a number of 
problems small-scale farmers face in diversifying into high-value commodities. Opponents argue that the 
imbalance in power between the buyer and the farmer leads to an agreement unfavorable to the farmer. A large 
majority of empirical studies suggest that contract farming schemes raise the income of farmers participating in 
the schemes. Contract farming schemes typically face a number of challenges that limit their ability to deliver 
inputs, credit, and technical assistance to small-scale farmers like side-selling, unwillingness of the company to 
pay the negotiated price and use quality standard to evade their commitments and high cost of working with large 
numbers of small-scale farmers. So, government policy should be to facilitate the development of contract farming 
schemes and developing countries can also promote pro-poor contract farming by creating a conducive policy 
environment. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Developing regions like sub – Saharan Africans small farmer face a number of constraints that limit their 
productivity. Lack of information about production methods and market opportunities, particularly for new crops 
and varieties, lack of the necessary financial reserves to invest in new crops, and their access to credit which is 
limited by the lack of collateral, and small farmers operating near subsistence are understandably more risk averse 
than larger farmers are the major constraints. Due to this they often prefer to assure themselves a minimum supply 
of food before expanding production of cash crops for an uncertain market. 
Contract farming has the potential to solve several of these constraints simultaneously. This why it attracts 
the interest of researchers and policymakers. Contract farming may be defined as agricultural production carried 
out according to a prior agreement in which the farmer commits to producing a given product in a given manner 
and the buyer commits to purchasing it. Often, the buyer provides the farmer with technical assistance, seeds, 
fertilizer, and other inputs on credit and offers a guaranteed price for the output (Eaton and Shepherd 2001). 
Large-scale farming also solves these problems in that large farmers have better access to credit, better 
information about production and marketing methods, and greater tolerance of risk. However, these advantages 
are offset by the higher costs and lower motivation of hired laborers compared to family members. Studies suggest 
that large- scale agriculture has become prominent in Kenya, Zimbabwe, and South Africa largely because of 
policy distortions which favored larger farmers (Deininger and Binswanger, 1995). Thus, contract farming is seen 
as a way to combine the advantages of large-scale production with the strengths of small-scale production.  
Although reliable estimates are not available, international trends in agriculture suggest that the prevalence 
of contract farming may well be increasing in developing countries. The growth of high-value agriculture, the 
expansion of agricultural processing in developing countries, the consolidation in the retail food sector, and the 
increased demand for quality and food safety are all driving the need for vertical coordination in agricultural supply 
chains (Gulati et al. 2006). 
However, the impact of contract farming is the subject of debate. Among proponents, contract farming is seen 
as a solution to the problems of information, credit, and market risk that small farmers face in commercial 
production. They see contract farming as facilitating the integration of small farmers into commercial agriculture, 
leading to income growth and poverty reduction. Critics, on the other hand, see contract farming as a way for large 
firms to take advantage of the land and poverty of small farmers, effectively paying them less than the minimum 
wage and taking control of their farms. The integration of small farmers into commercial agriculture is seen as a 
negative trend, leading to higher risk, indebtedness, and income inequality (Little and Watts 1994; Singh 2002). 
The purpose of this article is to critically review the literature on contract farming to assess the experience 
with contract farming in developing countries, emphasizing its impact on small-scale farmers in sub-Saharan 
Africa, as well as to the challenges facing contract farming. 
This review is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews experience with contract farming to help understand 
the main issues of the impact of contract farming on participating farmers and participation of small-scale farmers 
in contract farming schemes. Before concluding in Section 4, we illustrates in section 3 the challenges facing 
contract farming.  
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2. EXPERIENCE WITH CONTRACT FARMING 
2.1 Impact of contract farming on participating farmers 
Little and Watts (1994) pointed out a more skeptical view of the benefits of contract farming by compiling a set 
of seven case studies on contract farming in Sub-Saharan Africa. The case studies focus on the historical and 
political context of contract farming, conflicts between farmers and the contracting firms, the imbalance of power 
between the two parties, intra- household tensions over the division of labor and the allocation of new revenues, 
and the increasing rural inequality as contract farmers grow wealthy enough to hire farm laborers. In his summary 
of the cases, Little (1994, 221) concludes that incomes from contract farming increased for a moderate (30–40 
percent) to a high (50–60 percent) proportion of participants. This income was not enough to live on, however, 
and farmers had to rely on other farm and nonfarm income. In several cases, households lost land that was 
appropriated for government-run contract farming schemes. 
In a review of the experience of contract farming in Africa, Porter and Phillips-Howard (1997) conclude that 
farmer incomes are raised by contract farming, but they focus on social problems that it may cause, including lack 
of control over production, imbalance of power, income inequality, and intra-household conflict. They also note 
that contract farming schemes may be established on land appropriated from local communities. They propose a 
number of policies to limit the adverse effects of contract farming, including protection of property rights and 
independent mediation in case of disputes. 
Warning and Key (2002) study contract production of groundnuts in Senegal to compare income and other 
outcome variables for contract farmers and other similar farmers. NOVASEN, a private cooking-oil manufacturer, 
contracted with 32,000 growers and produced approximately 40,000 tons of groundnuts annually. Warning and 
Key find that the increase in gross agricultural revenues associated with contracting is statistically significant and 
large, equal to about 55 percent of the average revenue of noncontract farmers. They argue that the leverage of 
contract farmers is increased by the existence of parallel markets for the groundnuts. 
Contract farming is used to produce organic coffee in eastern Uganda. The company contracts close to 4000 
coffee farmers, providing technical assistance and organic certification. Bolwig et al (2007) compare farmers in 
the scheme with a control group, showing that there are positive revenue effects from participating in the scheme, 
even after controlling for a variety of other factors. 
Thus, the weight of evidence suggests that successful contract farming schemes generally raise the incomes 
of farmers who join them. The cases where contract farming does not improve farm income or at least reduce 
income volatility are often short-lived as the scheme collapses. 
 
2.2 Participation of small-scale farmers in contract farming schemes 
Even if farmers benefit from their contractual relations with processors and exporters, there is still the issue of 
whether small-scale farmers are able to participate in contract farming schemes. Some critics of contract farming 
argue that firms tend to work with medium and large-scale farmers (Little and Watts 1994). If so, contract farming 
may be an interesting institutional mechanism for vertical coordination, but it would have less relevance for 
poverty reduction strategies. In fact, by contributing to income inequality, it may exacerbate tensions between the 
social groups in rural areas.  
A number of studies examine the proportion of contract farmers that are smallholders, as an indicator of the 
pro-poor impact of contracting. Guo et al. (2005) use data from farm-level surveys in China covering several 
products to estimate the likelihood of participating in a contract farming scheme as a function of household 
characteristics, crop mix, and farm size. The results show that small farmers are less likely to participate in contract 
farming than larger farmers. 
Key and Runsten (1999) look at contract farming by the tomato-processing industry in Mexico. Multinational 
agro-processors from the United States first contracted with large growers but then involved small growers, partly 
because as a lucrative market for fresh tomatoes developed, firms found it increasingly difficult to enforce contracts 
they had with larger growers. 
In the study of groundnuts in Senegal, Warning and Key (2002) compared contract and independent farmers 
by various measures of assets. They found that indicators of asset ownership were not significant predictors of 
participation in the contract farming scheme, suggesting that contractors were typical rural households. In the study 
of contract farming in Indonesia, Simmons et al. (2005) found that contract seed growers had larger farms than 
independent growers, but contract poultry producers tended to be smaller than independent poultry growers. 
A few studies give examples of buyers shifting from small-scale to large-scale farmers or the reverse. One 
example, cited in World Bank (2006), is an exporter in Thailand that started producing its own horticultural 
products on company land and later shifted to smallholder contract production.  
Minot and Ngigi (2004) describe the evolution of several contract farming schemes in Kenya, including one 
(Del Monte pineapple) that gave up on contract production and shifted to vertically integrated plantation 
production. Maartens and Swinnen (2006) pointed out that Green bean exporters in Senegal switched from small-
scale contract production to large-scale contract production. These findings confirm that the comparative 
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advantage of smallholders is not a static concept, but it can change as farmers and buyers experiment and learn 
from experience.  
The fact that contract farming schemes occasionally switch from large-scale to small-scale farmers suggests 
that the cost differences between them is small, which implies that public policy may be able to play a role in 
encouraging the participation of small farmers in these supply chains. 
 
3. CHALLENGES FACING CONTRACT FARMING 
Although numerous studies confirm that contract farmers’ gain from participation, the studies also reveal frequent 
problems in these schemes. In fact, there is a relatively high rate of failure for contract farming schemes in 
developing countries. This is particularly evident in Kenya, which has a history of contract farming going back to 
the colonial period. Reviews of the evolution of contract farming schemes in Kenya reveal a high rate of turnover 
as schemes collapse and new ones are launched (Jaffee 1994; Ngigi and Minot, 2010). Similarly, Sartorius and 
Kirsten (2004) note “the high level of failure of small-scale farmer contract farming projects in developing 
countries” (p. 89). 
The most common problems in on-going contract farming schemes is side-selling, the sale of contracted 
output to other buyers. In some cases, farmers try to sell to other buyers in order to take advantage of a market 
price that is higher than the contracted price. In other cases, farmers sell to other buyers in order to avoid repayment 
of inputs they received on credit. Since the contracts are generally not legally enforceable the only leverage the 
firm has is to refuse to work with the farmer in the future. The problem of strategic default on credit has been 
exacerbated in some countries by lax enforcement in government-run credit programs, leading to the perception 
among farmers that non-repayment is an acceptable option.  
A related problem is that when market prices fall below the contracted price, the processor may be attracted 
to import or purchase from the open market instead of from contract growers. Although the company may be under 
pressure to respect the terms of the contract, it can impose strict quality standards on the contractors to avoid 
purchasing from them at the agreed price. The main leverage of farmers is to withdraw from the scheme or to bring 
the case to local officials for intervention. 
Another perennial problem with contract farming schemes is the high cost of dealing with large numbers of 
dispersed contract farmers. This is mainly true when the company distributes inputs, provides credit, and organizes 
the collection of the crop. Sartorius and Kirsten (2004) argue that this is one of the main reasons that companies 
often prefer to work with larger-scale farmers. One solution is to have another organization act as intermediary 
between the company and the farmers. Alternatively, a farmer cooperative may serve as an intermediary, 
facilitating the distribution of inputs and technical assistance, as well as the collection of the crop (Coulter et al 
2000).  
 
4. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Contract farming is a marketing institutions that has evolved to reduce transaction costs when there are economies 
of scale in processing or marketing but not in production, and when spot markets are not sufficient to match supply 
to quality-sensitive demand. 
The first major conclusion of this review is that the empirical evidence supports proponents of contract 
farming who argue that it often raises the income of small-scale farmers by providing access to credit, technical 
information, and specialized inputs, while sometimes reducing farm-level risk. At the same time, there is partial 
support for opponents of contract farming who argue that it may favor medium-scale growers over small-scale 
farmers, though this depends on the specific circumstances and the policy environment. 
Another point is that contract farming schemes typically face a number of challenges that limit their ability 
to deliver inputs, credit, and technical assistance to small-scale farmers. One of the most common problems is 
side-selling, when farmers sell to other buyers to avoid repaying loans or simply to obtain a better price. In addition, 
there are numerous cases of companies who are unable or unwilling to pay the negotiated price and use quality 
standard to evade their commitments. A third problem is the high cost of working with large numbers of small-
scale farmers, those this problem can be ameliorated with the use of farmer organizations or other intermediaries. 
Because of these problems, there is a relatively high rate of failure in contract farming schemes. 
Therefore, goal of government policy should be to facilitate the development of contract farming schemes, 
particularly those that involve small-scale farmers, but not to impose contracting or provide heavy financial 
incentives that would result in the use of contracting in situations where it is not appropriate. Developing countries 
can also promote pro-poor contract farming by creating a conducive policy environment.  
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